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1. ‘Being Gricean’ and its challenges: An overview 
 
There is no doubt that ‘being Gricean’ has a fuzzy category membership. Depending on the 
level of generalization and the associated defining characteristics, one can find oneself inside 
or outside of such an abstract camp. In what follows, I address the question of what ‘being 
Gricean’ can, and should, mean, forty years on. The foundational influence of Paul Grice 
(1989) on contemporary pragmatic theory, in the Anglo-American tradition and beyond, has 
its roots in several core characteristics that in combination guaranteed its success. First, there 
is the focus on speaker intentions, or, to be more precise, a concept of a model speaker’s 
intentions, in their role of explanantia for meaning in discourse. This he aptly combined with 
the rigidity of the truth-conditional method upon which his theory of communication is built. 
From the perspective of several decades, the defence of the truth-conditional method is 
sometimes considered as a weakness, in that implicatures were conceived of, so to speak, 
‘negatively’, as theoretical constructs that ‘save’ the truth-conditional approach. This 
criticism pertains, albeit in a different way, to Grice’s conceptualization of both conventional 
and conversational implicatures. However, future developments in the post-Gricean 
contextualist tradition (Sperber and Wilson 1986/95, 2012; Carston 1988, 2002; Recanati 
1989, 2010; Jaszczolt 2005, 2016a) have demonstrated that truth conditions are still the most 
precise tool that linguists have at their disposal to theorize about meaning in a way that 
affords systematicity and predictive power. Another characteristic that ought to be listed here 
is his classification of the directions that interactants follow in deriving implied meanings that 
allows for the calculation and prediction of implicatures – a classification in the form of 
maxims of conversation. Again, although these have since been criticised for their lack of 
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psychological plausibility and the lack of methodological rigidity, and have been pulled in 
different directions by neo-Griceans and Relevance theorists (Horn 1984, 1988; Levinson 
1987, 2000; Sperber and Wilson 1986/95), a systematic account of conversational inference 
arguably remains Grice’s main legacy.2 Next, when we combine these cornerstones with the 
philosophical foundations of meaningNN whereby the recognition of the speaker’s intention 
and the associated hearer’s belief about the speaker’s meaning also become the necessary 
defining characteristics, it is easy to see how the legacy is discernible both in the psychology 
of utterance processing and in many formal, including computational, approaches to 
modelling meaning.  
Arguably, forty years on, post-Gricean pragmatics is still the most successful and 
methodologically rigorous approach to utterance meaning. However, and perhaps as a 
corollary of its extensive development, it has become necessary to ask what ‘being Gricean’ 
means for its current advocates. In this paper I address this question with respect to the 
current Anglo-American, truth-conditional paradigm, asking specifically how much, and on 
what identifiable dimensions, one can depart from his program and still remain ‘Gricean’. In 
the past four decades, ‘being Gricean’ used to be associated with a well-focused, fairly 
unidirectional inquiry into meaning. ‘Post-Griceans’ tended to question the plausibility of the 
semantics/pragmatics boundary that emerged from his delimitation of what is said (Grice 
1978), progressing to questioning the need for semantic ambiguity in support of semantic 
underdetermination and the associated intrusion of pragmatic information into the truth-
conditional content (Atlas 1977, 1979, 1989; Kempson 1975, 1979, 1986; Wilson 1975; 
Sperber and Wilson 1986/95). But the state-of-the-art of ‘being Gricean’ appears to be very 
different. The term ‘Gricean pragmatics’ appears to have been diluted to such an extent that it 
is has become necessary to ask what criteria one ought to adopt to delimit this orientation.  
The label has generated very different challenges on several dimensions. First, (i) the 
role of inferential meanings has been questioned in that communication has since often been 
envisaged as mostly direct and non-inferential (Recanati, e.g. 2004, 2016). In a similar spirit, 
(ii) the layered, also sometimes called ‘pipeline’ or ‘imbricated’ picture of meaning (Parikh 
2010) has been questioned within situation and game-theoretic semantics (Lewis 1979; 
Barwise and Perry 1983), and recently in their offshoot Equilibrium Semantics (Parikh 2010). 
It has been argued that discourse meaning ought not to be analysed by breaking it down into 
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the logical form (the output of syntactic processing), its expansions and completions (a.k.a. 
modulation, explicatures, or implicitures, depending on the framework3), and additional 
inferred meanings (implicatures), because in practice its recovery follows the principles of 
interaction or a language game in which the players simply strive for an equilibrium. The 
‘pipeline’ picture has been put into question in a double way in that it does not suffice to 
demonstrate empirically that (ii.a) various processes of meaning recovery need not 
necessarily take place in a fixed order (which post-Griceans have already accomplished) but 
also (ii.b) the very classification of aspects of meaningNN seems to be called into question. 
Next, (iii) the explanatory role of intentions has often been denied in an attempt to reinstate 
the idea of multiple semantic ambiguities in lieu of meaning underdetermination, with the 
aim of aiding computational, formalizable accounts of discourse meaning (e.g. Lepore and 
Stone 2015). This has reopened the question as to (iv) what kind of content, and how much of 
it, is attributable to grammar, following up on earlier proposals of the grammatical origin of 
some pragmatic meanings that were standardly classified as implicatures (Chierchia 2004; 
Chierchia et al. 2012). Along yet another dimension, (v) the focus on cooperative interaction 
and  proposition-based theorizing has been replaced with a focus on non-cooperative, such as 
strategic, communication and dialogue as the associated object of analysis (e.g. Asher and 
Lascarides 2013). Finally, Grice’s project was a project in philosophy of language and as 
such in philosophical pragmatics. Theoretical, introspection-based methods employed 
without recourse to experimental or other empirical inquiries are nowadays shunned in many 
pragmatics circles. So, the question arises regarding (vi) the place of philosophical 
pragmatics on a map of current research into meaning in communication.  
In this context, a metapragmatic question arises as to what qualitative and associated 
quantitative criteria current pragmatic theory has to fulfil in order to count as Gricean 
pragmatics. In this paper I address this question by discussing the identified areas (i)-(vi). 
Further, in doing so, using these indicators, I attempt to address the question ‘Quo vadis, 
pragmatics?’ with respect to the post-Gricean tradition. My metatheoretic inquiry begins by 
critically discussing the dimensions on which the Gricean program has been challenged and 
proceeds to arguing that none of the challenges constitutes a real threat to it. I develop two 
strands of argumentation showing how the approaches either (a) can be incorporated as its 
extensions or (b) are in pursuit of different goals and as such are not in competition with it. 
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Argument (a) applies to automatic meaning assignment, the rejection of the ‘pipeline’ picture 
of meaning, emphasis on conventions, strategic conversation and generalized cognition. 
Argument (b) applies to the revival of semantic ambiguity and the grammatical foundation of 
implicatures. It is therefore concluded that the Gricean program can be relaxed on the 
dimensions covered by (a) and co-exist with the approaches subscribing to (b).  
 
2. A metapragmatic journey 
The directions along which the Gricean program has been questioned, identified in Section 1, 
have roots that are at least cotemporaneous with Grice. But it is only relatively recently that 
‘non-Gricean communication’ has been brought to the fore in this contrastive juxtaposition, 
either through emphasising the fact that cooperation cannot be taken for granted and, 
arguably a fortiori, that cooperative conversation is by no means the only kind of 
conversation worth investigating4, or by denying the adequacy of a proposition-based account 
of meaning. The directions in (i)-(vi) all revolve around these main challenges, one of which 
we can call teleological and the other structural. In other words, the aims of the interactants 
are diversified and do not always fit under the umbrella term of cooperation (the teleological 
challenge) and the conceptual structure does not always fit neatly with the proposition 
derived from the logical form of the uttered sentence; it may not even follow from it as its 
extension (the structural challenge).  
In Section 3 I further discuss the six identified dimensions. Before that, however, it is 
necessary to explain what is meant here by a ‘metapragmatic journey’. While 
‘metasemantics’ is a relatively well established theoretical concept, ‘metapragmatics’ is still 
largely up for grabs.5 Metasemantics concerns itself with providing a theoretical framework 
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interactions, about the language that is being used in those interactions’. This definition, close to Caffi’s (iii), 
allows him to explore the use of corpus-based methods for the investigation of metapragmatic terms. Haugh’s 
definition is guided by the assumption that a theorist identifies and follows common practices in attempting to 
understand linguistic interaction – in other words, it works on the ethnomethodological assumptions. My use of 
the term is broader and more in line with Caffi’s (i): it pertains to ‘theories about pragmatic theories’. But it also 
reflects a rather fundamental difference in the judgement of the playing field: it is no longer the case that 
metasemantics is an obscure and neglected area (Caffi 1994/2006: 83). Metasemantics is now at a forefront of 
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for the theory of linguistic meaning. As such, it addresses metatheoretic questions, questions 
belonging to philosophy of linguistics, such as what constitutes the object of study of the 
theory of meaning or what direction should be taken in addressing questions about meaning 
(see Soames 2014a). It is sometimes identified with the ‘metaphysics of meaning’ in that 
‘metasemantics is in the business of providing metaphysical explanations of semantic facts’ 
(Burgess and Sherman 2014: 2). It addresses foundational questions concerning how 
linguistic structures and corresponding thoughts relate to the world.6 Analogously, 
metapragmatics concerns itself with ‘metaphysics of communication’ and with foundational 
questions about communication. When taken as part of the discipline of linguistics7, it 
becomes a metatheoretic inquiry into how linguistic communication relates to the world. In 
simpler terms, just as metasemantics theorizes about theories of meaning, so metapragmatics 
theorizes about theories of communication. It addresses the foundations of the study of 
language use. What follows is an inquiry into metapragmatics. 
 
3.  Gricean pragmatics, quo vadis? 
3.1. Questioning the ‘pipeline’ picture 
There is a relatively simple and methodical picture that arises from Grice’s (1975, 1978) 
theory of meaningNN: there is what is said, the truth-conditional content of the sentence, 
pertaining to the output of syntactic processing, completed when necessary by the resolution 
of indexical terms and disambiguation. This component gives rise to an array of implicatures, 
some of which embellish it, and others stem out of the blatant need to deny it. Next, post-
Gricean research moved the boundary of the truth-conditional content and allowed in more 
pragmatic aspects of meaning. It also questioned the order in which these components are 
accessed (e.g. Carston 2007). But the question addressed here is not where to place the 
boundary between semantics and pragmatics8 but rather whether this segmented, essentially 
syntax-based representation consisting of a logical form plus pragmatic enrichment or other 
amendments, plus implicatures offers the most adequate representation of meaning in 
communication in the first place. First of all, communication is often conceived of as direct, 
                                                          
inquiry in philosophy of language (see e.g. the contributions to Burgess and Sherman, eds, 2014). As such, it 
testifies against the Wittgensteinian (1953) scepticism, followed by Caffi (1994/2006), about the utility of 
foundational metadiscourse.  
6 For the discussion of the term see also Soames 2014a and other contributions to Burgess and Sherman (eds) 
2014; Soames 2014b, c and Jaszczolt 2018. For an example of a metasemantic inquiry see Sainsbury 2014 and a 
response in Jaszczolt 2017. 
7 There is no consensus on this matter but we will take pragmatics to mean ‘the study of human language use as 
it is exercised in a community of social practice’ (Mey 2006: 51). 
8 See Jaszczolt 2012 for an overview. 
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non-inferential. On this construal, a speaker’s thought is essentially indexical, in the sense 
that in thinking one employs context-dependent and perspectival private modes of 
presentation, and is represented as such by the addressee. Presenting it as ‘a thought 
expressed by an utterance’ distorts the picture (Recanati 2016). By recognising this directness 
we would come close to a view where communication is seen as a series of interactively 
made decisions: a game where a speaker’s choice of an utterance and the addressee’s choice 
of the interpretation must reach an equilibrium: ‘a balance among the choices and strategies 
available to the speaker and addressee in each game’ (Parikh 2010: 26). Game theory, and as 
such interactive decision-making, has been applied to linguistic communication to focus on 
situations and the choices interlocutors make in them.9 In contrast, the Gricean picture 
appears as the assumed but somewhat counterintuitive ‘pipeline’ view (Parikh 2010: 123): 
underspecified semantic representations subjected (globally or locally, no matter) to 
pragmatic influences conform to the methodological principle ‘to get as far as we can with 
just language by itself and bring in situations only when we fail to go all the way’ (ibid.). The 
post-Gricean ‘more imbricated picture of meaning’ (Parikh 2010: 5) in the form of radical 
pragmatics comes a little closer to game-theoretic semantics but, according to Parikh, is not 
satisfactory precisely because it does not go the whole way towards blurring the boundaries 
between the components and aspects of utterance meaning in favour of situated speech 
actions (moves in a language game). On the other hand, game-theoretic semantics such as 
Parikh’s (2010) Equilibrium Semantics comes first and permeates every level of linguistic 
communication, so to speak, as a matter of course, not merely as a special process of meaning 
adjustment. Explicit and implicit, locutionary and illocutionary meanings are treated equally 
and achieve equal status. And they are all in the domain of semantic analysis. 
So, is there logical progression that might lead a Gricean towards a game-theoretic 
account without at any point entirely relinquishing the essence of ‘being Gricean’? Let us 
first look at the object of study. Default Semantics (Jaszczolt 2005, 2010) professes to be a 
Gricean theory of communication in the sense that it founds the analysis of meaning in 
communication on speaker intentions and their recognition; it also concerns itself with the 
propositional content of the intended (and recovered) message and as such makes use of the 
truth-conditional method. At the same time, it takes acts of communication as its object in 
that the primary/secondary meaning distinction adopted there is orthogonal to the what is 
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said/what is implicated divide: if the message is delivered indirectly, it is the main, primary 
implicature that constitutes the primary meaning and it is this implicature that acquires the 
truth-conditional treatment. So, Default Semantics rejects the post-Gricean ‘imbricated 
picture of meaning’ but preserves the core Gricean assumptions concerning the provenance 
and type of meaning that constitutes the object of analysis: intended, recovered, based on 
general principles of rationality, formalizable, truth-conditional. It agrees with Equilibrium 
Semantics on the uniform treatment of explicit and implicit meaning (Parikh 2010: 162) in 
that, to repeat, the primary/secondary meaning distinction cuts across the said/implicit divide. 
For example, given the conversation in (1), both theories would take the meaning in (2b) 
rather than (2a) as their main object of analysis. Allowing for a given context, the bridging 
premise that in the United Kingdom it is illegal to sell alcohol to persons under 18 years old 
leads directly to the primary intended message in (2b). 
 
(1) A: Can I have some champagne? 
 B: You are under 18. 
(2a) A is under 18 years old. 
(2b) A cannot have champagne. 
 
This liberal construction of the primary meaning, which then becomes the object of truth-
conditional analysis, has already led to discussions as to whether Default Semantics is ‘still 
Gricean’.10 Even if it belongs to the post-Gricean camp in view of the adopted order of 
explanation from intentions to meanings, it questions the utility of the cline within meaningNN 
and opts for a conceptual representation that merges information arrived at through different 
interacting processes that is not constrained by the Gricean ‘pipeline’ picture. Next, although 
at present it remains uncommitted on the question of modularity (Jaszczolt 2016a), it has 
some affinity with approaches that question the modular approach to meaning and replace it 
with the view of language understanding as social cognition, founded on goals and actions, 
such as for example Goodman and Stuhlmüller (2013) and Goodman and Lassiter (2015), 
where general cognitive mechanisms are responsible for the recovery of implicatures. Finally, 
it is compatible with the empirical evidence for discerned patterns of activity that emphasise 
the role of conventions in decision making (Jaszczolt and Witek 2018). In short, it comes 
close to models utilising speech acts, conventions and social practices.  
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One recent proposal of a non-Gricean outlook on communication that generated more 
discussion and controversy than the others is Lepore and Stone’s (2015) Imagination and 
Convention: Distinguishing Grammar and Inference in Language. One of the least 
controversial claims there is probably that Grice’s conversational implicature has been given 
too significant a role in utterance interpretation and part of its burden should legitimately go 
to conventions. One of the most controversial ones is subsuming conventions under the 
power of grammar and leaving pragmatics with the task of disambiguation. We have here the 
reopening of the old discussion of intentions vis-à-vis conventions known from Strawson and 
Searle, but now put in the new light of reopening the question of the power of grammar – a 
topic the importance of which I flag in the next section. According to Lepore and Stone, 
intentions should be avoided as an explanatory tool. There is powerful grammar that arguably 
sorts out anaphoric links, presuppositions, and indexicals. Then there are conventions that 
belong with the grammar, and finally there is the whole array of what they call ‘imagination’ 
– interpretations that follow the direction specific to the individual’s thought and as such fall 
outside of the domain of theoretical linguistic inquiry; ‘imaginative practices’ are separate 
from meaning and grammar. Essentially, ‘meaning is a matter of conventions’ (p. 199): it is 
not up for grabs, it is ‘grammatically specified’ (p. 208).11  
 There are two ways to view this apparent contrast between Gricean and game-
theoretic (or goal-, action-, convention-based) approaches. The first one is to contrast them in 
that the order of explanation appears to be opposite: from intentions to conventions and from 
conventions to intentions respectively. But there is a much more satisfactory way of assessing 
their compatibility, on which ‘being Gricean’ reveals itself to be a half-way point on the way 
to what we often take as the opposite order of explanation. In Speech Act Theory, the 
emphasis is on conventions and patterns. So, the order of explanation appears to be the 
opposite from that adopted by Griceans: speech acts explain speakers’ intentions as it were 
rather than the other way round. And here is where Leezenberg’s (2006) proposal fits in. 
Relying on the explanatory power of intentions encounters one serious danger, spelled out by 
Leezenberg (2006: 4-5) as follows:  
 
‘…Grice presupposes a strongly universalist (dare I say Kantian?) conception of 
rationality: given a specific situation, there seems to be just one optimally rational 
course of action, which is the same for all humans’.  
                                                          




But at the same time, he points out that this is only part of the picture; it seems necessary to 
consider the foundations of such a view that can be traced to the European tradition in 
political philosophy, in particular Hobbes and Rousseau, and the idea of liberalism based on 
the rationality of adhering to a social contract which entails adhering to societal norms and 
conventions. In this light, what had appeared to be the opposite order of explanation appears 
to be the Gricean order but taken further, to its historical and logical limits. The question then 
arises whether one can go that far with Grice’s universalism and deflate the explanatory role 
of intentions in favour of precisely these conventions and patterns from which his maxims 
arguably emerge. Looked at in this light, ‘being Gricean’ amounts to merely stopping part-
way, so to speak, acknowledging the role of conventions in generalized conversational 
implicatures but not beyond, short of embracing the true origin of his heuristics and, a 
fortiori, short of embracing the explanatory role of conventions.  
As a case study, Leezenberg contrasts here what he calls ‘Confucian pragmatics’ that 
relies on adhering to conventions (‘rites’) and Gricean pragmatics that, arguably, can 
ultimately be traced to conventions but does not make a methodological use of them: Grice 
proceeds from intentions to explaining linguistic behaviour, while Confucius, and closer to 
home ordinary language philosophers (Wittgenstein 1953; Austin 1962) proceed in the 
opposite direction. Perhaps it is with this reversal of the order of explanation that ‘being 
Gricean’ truly ends. And if so, then ‘being Gricean’ can be seen either (i.a) positively, 
couched in Kantian tradition, or, again (i.b) positively, as a philosophical prelude to a journey 
into psychologism as undertaken for instance by Relevance theory, or, less favourably, (ii) as 
stopping half-way before the explanation in terms of speech acts, social rules, laws and 
conventions is reached. Construal (i) amounts to a qualitative contrast, while (ii) to 
quantitative differences on a cline of explanatory tools: from intentions to conventions, or 
from rationality of behaviour to social rules. But taking this analysis further requires a 
separate, more extensive inquiry in metapragmatics. I shall now flag, very briefly, the 
remaining aspects on which ‘being Gricean’ is to be assessed.  
 
3.2. ‘Put the blame on Mame, boys’: The power of grammar 
According to Lepore and Stone (2015: 83), ‘[p]ragmatics can be, at most, a theory of 
disambiguation; pragmatic reasoning never contributes content to utterances’. They consider 
disambiguation to be the sole pragmatic process, defined as ‘finding the right reading of the 
utterance, understood as a grammatically specified pairing of form and meaning’ (p. 88). 
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Some of the proposed domains in which the explanation has shifted away from pragmatics 
are well justified in principle. For example, scalar implicatures are viewed there as effects of 
information structure. But, on the other hand, information structure is understood as an 
epiphenomenon of grammar, which is much more contentious than its construal in the 
cognate theory of Segmented Discourse Representation (SDRT, Asher and Lascarides 2003) 
where the ‘logic of information packaging’ (the logic using nonmonotonic inference) and its  
metalanguage they call ‘glue logic’ (accounting for the rhetorical relations between 
propositions) are separate from the content, represented in a separate metalanguage (‘logic of 
information content’). In other words, the pragmatic rules and the grammar are kept suitably 
distinct. In other words again, when we put theories of presupposition, indexicals and 
anaphora resolution, or scalar implicature, in the domain of information structure, this can be 
understood either (i) as being caused directly by the grammar, as in Lepore and Stone or 
Chierchia (2004, 2012), or (ii) as the effect of the ‘middle’ system of discourse structure that 
affords its own metalanguage and rules, as in SDRT. Needless to say, it is the first that 
requires a greater leap of faith: discourse rules have to be fitted into the grammar bottom-up, 
starting with the language system itself.  
 For scalar implicature, Chierchia (2004) defends the following view. Grammar 
contains ‘interpretive procedures’ that result in two different values of expressions: the 
ordinary value and the one strengthened by the upper bound. So, ‘implicatures, like core 
meaning, are computed compositionally bottom-up, off LF structures’ (Chierchia 2004: 64). 
Grammatical conditions, such as downward-entailing contexts, provide the necessary 
constraints. So, scalars are not, pace Grice, wholly pragmatic. But we have to remember that 
not all scalars are alike. Some of them cannot be attributed to the interpretive procedures of 
grammar as readily as others – ad hoc scales being at the very end of such a spectrum as 
entirely context-dependent, purpose-made sets of alternatives. Even among typical, 
generalized-implicature scalars, some expressions give rise to upper-bounded readings more 
easily than others (Tiel et al 2016). So, the attempted takeover by grammar is not as 
threatening to the Gricean program as it may appear to be: some scalars may be generated by 
grammar, but then the utility of the theory has to be limited just to this category – and even 
within the category the generalization has to allow for vagaries of interpretation. In a similar 
vein, Stanley and Szabó’s (2000) proposal of a grammatical trigger of quantifier domain 
restriction, where a common noun ‘co-habits’ the N node with the contextually salient 
restriction, is an attempt at a structure-based explanation of a kind of meaning that is 
essentially purely context-driven. 
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Presupposition and anaphora are other areas where the debate over the role of 
grammar still continues but this topic will have to be left for another occasion. Suffice it to 
say that solutions to discourse anaphora seem to pull it in different directions. For example,  
the presupposition as anaphora view advocates going back along the projection line in search 
of an antecedent and if a suitable one is not found, accommodating, making use of pragmatic 
factors  that contribute to the preference order (van der Sandt 1992, 2012), while Lepore and 
Stone (2015: 124-125), following the tradition in attention theory (see e.g. Grosz et al. 1995 
and Kehler 2002 for a discussion),  advocate the priority of binding to subject in that the 
subject position is, according to them, associated with higher prominence and as such 
acquires by convention the dedicated role of an antecedent in anaphoric links. In view of the 
lack of empirical support, and emerging support to the contrary, their claim fails to stand.12 
Grammar is also deemed responsible for differences in reading between cases of sentential 
conjunction, where, according to Lepore and Stone, the Simple Past tense form in (3a) 
triggers the temporal sequence interpretation by (grammatical) convention, while the Present 
Perfect counterpart in (3b) lacks this interpretation. 
 
(3a) Oil prices doubled and demand for consumer goods plunged. 
(3b) Oil prices have doubled and demand for consumer goods has plunged. 
 
(from Lepore and Stone 2015: 23, 117).13 As they say (p. 119), ‘with tense (..), understanding 
involves choosing the reading that makes the most sense from the candidates delivered by the 
grammar.’14  
Empirical research conducted within my ongoing project supports the presupposition 
as anaphora view but not the default binding to subject. Instead, it supports a strong 
contextual effect from biasing situations.15 What matters for our current purpose is that the 
attempts to trace the discourse-anaphoric link to grammar are not strongly supported. Even if 
there is a default dependence, the fact that biasing context can override it means that the 
form-meaning association is not on a par with the meaning generated by the lexicon or 
                                                          
12 See Sileo and Jaszczolt forthcoming for empirical evidence that their example (i) (Lepore and Stone 2015: 
124) does not generalize. 
(i) The President nominated Jones. He expected a quick confirmation. 
13 My thanks go to Roberto B. Sileo for drawing my attention to these examples. For empirical evidence against 
the grammatical explanation of conjunction see Jaszczolt and Sileo in progress.  
14 My emphasis. 
15 ‘Rethinking being Gricean’. See references in fn *, 12 and 13. 
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grammar and as such deserves its separate level of analysis – à la Gricean pragmatics or 
SDRT. Mutatis mutandis, the same argument pertains to scalar implicatures.  
At the same time, when Lepore and Stone (2015: 117) claim that Grice’s derivation of 
the temporal meaning of and ‘hides a covert appeal to a convention’, we are reminded of 
Leezenberg’s pursuit of Grice’s derivation all the way to its alleged origin in conventions. So, 
although the appeal to grammar may prove to have gone one step too far, the explanatory role 
of conventions seems to be at least compatible with both views. And, to repeat, if conventions 
are to acquire the role of an explanans, we have to decide whether this reverses the order of 
explanation or merely takes intention-based generalizations to their natural end.  
 In the context of the discussion of the criteria delineating ‘being Gricean’, it appears 
that carving off some of the phenomena and allocating them to grammar poses no real threat. 
What is concerning, however, is how they are allocated to grammar. In Lepore and Stone’s 
account, the middle level of cross-sentential discourse relations becomes allocated to 
grammar, so to speak, by fiat. Next, grammar is assumed to produce multiple, alternative 
interpretations. While this outlook may be advantageous for computational modelling of 
discourse, and as such for, say, distributional, vector semantics (see Jurafsky and Martin 
2009, 2016), the difference is that it doesn’t aim at the psychological plausibility that is so 
indispensable in an account of communication. A fortiori, a reductive explanation provided 
by psychologism is not a methodological option. Psychologism may be rightfully exorcised 
from accounts of language systems, but when we theorize about language use, it becomes a 
methodologically viable, and tempting, form of reductionism. On the other hand, on Lepore 
and Stone’s division of the field, grammar becomes overly powerful – ‘blamed’, so to speak, 
for a wide range of ambiguities. It leaves pragmatics with the modest role of disambiguating 
and exorcising all that doesn’t fit – metaphors and any form of non-literality – to the 
extralinguistic domain of private thoughts and ‘imaginings’. But ‘blaming it all on grammar’ 
simply will not do – grammar is a property of the language system, and syntactic analysis is a 
tool that is rightfully supposed to take us only part-way towards speaker meaning. Invoking 
multiple meanings and ascribing them to grammar runs the risk of confusing an analysis on 
the level of language system with an analysis of communication. Grammar becomes a femme 
fatale, Mame from the song sung by Rita Hayworth16 in Gilda whom one can blame for all 
the world’s disasters – the earthquake in San Francisco, shooting in Klondike, misplaced 
meaning, and all.  
                                                          




3.3. The uncooperative principle? 
Game-theoretic approaches have another important weakening effect on the Gricean 
principles in that they foreground the fact that not all communication is cooperative. There 
are standard scenarios and standard settings in which implicatures do not appear to conform 
to Gricean maxims, neo-Gricean principles or heuristics, or the principles of Relevance. Such 
scenarios are quite fixed and limited: courtroom interaction, teacher-pupil interaction, 
haggling over the price of goods, or political discussion. We can add to this any conversation 
that proceeds on the assumption of the lack of cooperation, for some reason or other – for 
example to avoid punishment or blame, to protect someone’s reputation or right to privacy, to 
ensure the confidentiality of a piece of information, or to prevent distress. Gricean and post-
Gricean accounts tend to marginalise these scenarios, while game-theoretic accounts that 
foreground speech actions, conventions, and the ‘equilibrium-seeking’ conversational 
behaviour stress their significance: ‘people often communicate in the context of diverging 
interests’ (Asher and Lascarides 2013: 11). The question that arises for the purpose of this 
discussion is whether they pose a threat to the Gricean way of explaining conversation. Asher 
and Lascarides view Gricean cooperative interaction as a subset of cases; they derive its 
explanation from game-theoretic principles.17 The core question is of course whether these 
scenarios are truly cases of non-Gricean communication or merely cases where the speaker 
has good reasons to lie, mislead, hide the truth, and so forth and these reasons are perfectly 
explicable within the Gricean framework on some level of sub-intentions. But if, for the sake 
of the argument, we consider them to be non-Gricean, the answer to the threat question may 
depend on the choice of one of the two directions discussed in Section 3.1: either we rest with 
the claim that Gricean principles and principles of ordinary language philosophy including 
Speech Act Theory employ opposite orders of explanation as far as the ‘intention  
meaning’ relation is concerned, or we go along with Leezenberg’s view that Grice stops half-
                                                          
17 ‘…we have derived Gricean cooperativity from a more general game-theoretic axiomatization of human 
behaviour that also handles non-cooperative conversation. … we have replaced Gricean derivations of 
implicatures based on shared intentions with a different picture in which discourse coherence and its attendant 
implicatures emerge as a rational preference.’ Asher and Lascarides (2013: 49). The question arises here as to 
whether their understanding of cooperation is the same as Grice’s or perhaps is dictated by goals rather than the 
recovery of beliefs and intentions. Many thanks to Chi-Hé Elder for pointing this out to me. Moreover, as one 
referee points out, ‘shared intentions’ are too strong a condition to attribute to Grice’s account of 
communication. A more appropriate understanding of the explanatory role of intentions in Grice’s account is to 
refer to a concept of a model speaker’s intentions, as I have done in Section 1 and in my theory of Default 
Semantics. An alternative route would be to weaken the condition as it was subsequently proposed in Relevance 
theory. I am flagging these important questions here and will leave them for a separate discussion. 
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way towards the explanation, i.e. does not go as far as societal norms that underlie human 
rational behaviour and its principles. The choice is, to a large extent, methodological: it is a 
matter of what one wants to emphasise in theoretical explanations and how far it is 
reasonable to proceed. After all, one can take the explanatory dependency even further, from 
societal norms to biological laws, and then even to quantum theory, but these are much less 
likely to be considered as the possible limits of the Gricean thought! Methodological 
reductionism cannot be unprincipled. 
 
3.4. The future of philosophical pragmatics 
Paul Grice was a philosopher. He was interested in generalizations over human cooperative 
conversation and tried to put them into a format that allowed for making predictions. He also 
put them in a format that facilitated the formalization of pragmatics.18 He was committed to 
the truth-conditional method of analysing meaning as the most precise and powerful way of 
approaching the vagaries of structures and the lexicon, on the foundation of which he built his 
model of speaker meaning. Finally, he was committed to intentions as an explanatory tool. 
But he was not committed to a distinction between linguistic and non-linguistic ‘utterances’, 
neither was he interested in linguistic or behavioural data beyond introspection and common-
sense exemplification of the rationality of human conversational behaviour. When his views 
were taken up by linguists interested in utterance processing and linguists pursuing corpus or 
experimental pragmatics, this created a danger of teleological mismatches. Quite often in 
‘proving Grice wrong’ they run the risk of talking at cross purposes: Grice’s generalized 
implicatures do not become any less valuable generalizations when they are shown to be 
triggered by default in some contexts but not others or when they are shown not to be quick 
to process. His conventional implicatures do not become any less indispensable in his own 
model when they are argued to contribute to truth-conditional content: they were merely an 
answer to the problem with an imperfect metalanguage. Grice’s program in philosophical 
pragmatics has to be taken as a self-contained entity and only used as an inspiration for 
exercises that differ in desiderata and methods.  
In his ‘Pragmatics in the history of linguistic thought’, Andreas Jucker (2012: 512) 
predicts ‘a continuing and perhaps accelerating diversification of approaches within 
pragmatics’, also stressing the impact of computer-mediated communication on the goals and 
                                                          
18 See e.g. Optimality Theory Pragmatics (Blutner and Zeevat 2004) that utilises Grice’s maxims or neo-Gricean 
principles and heuristics in formulating constraints. 
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directions, and of corpus pragmatics on the methods. These predictions are already coming 
true. But, arguably, they do not diminish the need for philosophical pragmatics à la Grice. By 
‘philosophical pragmatics’ I mean here not only the traditional methods used in philosophy to 
address questions about meaning in conversation but more generally, as I extensively explain 
elsewhere, ‘theoretical pragmatics (P) viewed as a branch of philosophy of language (PL) that 
concerns itself with meaning in natural language discourse and its relation to the mind and 
the world’ (Jaszczolt 2018: 136) – pragmaticsPPL. In spite of significant advances in 
neuroscience, we still know relatively little about how meaning is represented in the mind 
and how the process of meaning recovery proceeds. There are formal representations in 
semantics and pragmatics, on both sides of the Gricean/non-Gricean divide, that aspire to the 
status of mental representations. But there is no doubt that the debate itself belongs to the 
domain of philosophical pragmatics understood as pragmaticsPPL
19. A fortiori, there is no 
doubt that philosophical pragmatics will continue to occupy an important place, undiminished 
by the widening choice of methods. After all, metapragmatics concerns itself with 
pragmaticsPPL and only indirectly with methods such as theoretical argumentation, 
introspection, experimentation, corpus-study and so forth.  
 
4. Conclusions 
The question we have been pursuing here is: What exactly does one have to share with Grice 
to belong, in 2019, to what can be broadly called a Gricean paradigm in pragmatics? One 
definitely has to acknowledge the explanatory role of intentions, but these could arguably be 
taken as a route to social practices or conventions. And it appears that in spite of the advances 
of accounts that pack implicatures into grammar, intentions and conventions (as distinct from 
grammar) are still thriving as explanatory tools.20 One also has to adopt the truth-conditional 
method of analysing meaning in that the entire Gricean program is built on the premise of 
‘saving’ truth-conditional semantics by adding a pragmatic remedy. But, arguably, the extent 
and quality of the object analysed in this way can remain variable. The weakening of the 
appeal of the ‘pipeline’ picture is not a threat to the Gricean explanation of meaning: the 
object of study can be construed in a variety of ways while retaining intentions as an 
                                                          
19 This qualification is necessary as the term ‘philosophical pragmatics’ is used in a variety of ways, for example 
as subsumed under philosophical logic or as subsumed under linguistic philosophy. See Jaszczolt 2018 for a 
discussion. 
20 To give a couple of recent examples, see ‘Understanding intentions behind the referential/attributive 
distinction’ (Henricks Stotts 2017) and, in a more unusual domain, an implicature-based account of the 
imperfective paradox in Vidal and Perrin 2017 where inference from the situation is responsible for the 
terminative or non-terminative reading of the progressive form.   
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explanans and the truth-conditional method – the Default Semantics briefly discussed in 
Section 3.1 is an example of such an approach. Next, the revived grammar-pragmatics tug of 
war seems to result in a draw: some phenomena pragmaticised by Grice and grammaticised 
by computational linguists and formal semanticists seem to be best placed in the domain of 
discourse rules and conventions. Concerning the methods, pragmatics appears to give room 
both to empirical and philosophical (Gricean) inquiry: the first to firmly ground the 
generalization about language use through the research on corpora or through 
experimentation, and the latter to form initial hypothesis to be tested and, post-empirically, to 
launch theories that go beyond data-based generalizations. In other words, from the 
metapragmatic perspective, experimental and corpus pragmatics appear not as substitutes for 
philosophical pragmatics but as its methodological aids: the raison d’être of pragmaticsPPL is 
not traditional argumentation and introspection but the identification of explanantia (ways to 
answer questions, explain phenomena, methods) and explananda (phenomena to be 
explained, questions and objectives). As such, it answers to metapragmatics, while methods 
in pragmatics, in turn, answer to pragmaticsPPL.  
Needless to say, although this brief discussion provides some foundations for 
addressing the question ‘Quo vadis, pragmatics?’, taking it further to future predictions would 
have to be an exercise in informed speculation. But the picture that emerges from this 
discussion testifies to (a) the possibility of blending of convention- and intention-based 
accounts, (b) the progressing awareness of the limitations of the ‘pipeline’ picture of 
meaning, as well as (c) the increasing foregrounding of non-cooperative communication. In 
this context, it also seems very likely that the main object of study may in the future follow 
the goal-theoretic, speech-act-based rather than Gricean, grammar-based directives. However, 
although Gricean pragmatics emerges from this inquiry as a view that is in principle more 
compatible with various other ways of construing meaning than a cursory glance at them 
would suggest, at this point ‘being Gricean’ seems to cease to fulfil its raison d’être.  
Including (the theoretical construct of) speaker’s intentions as an explanans when 
conversational behaviour cannot be pegged on conventions or social rules, and following the 
truth-conditional method applied to a proposition that may pertain to an indirectly expressed 
thought, are justifiable characteristics of a pragmatic theory and, as we argued, are perfectly 
compatible with the Gricean direction of theorizing, but, paradoxically, they don’t result in 
‘being Gricean’: they result in a more adequate account of meaning in communication tout 
court. My tentative prediction is that, following a natural and positive stage of pluralism with 
respect to theoretical assumptions, concepts and explanations, pragmatic theory will cease to 
17 
 
employ labels such as ‘game theory, ‘Speech Act Theory’, or ‘Gricean pragmatics’ and 
emerge from the fragmentation of the pre-paradigmatic stage21 to form a paradigm in the 
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